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The reduction in the amount of resources available to many agencies has led to 
the reduction in size or elimination of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams. 
Multi-jurisdictional SWAT teams provide a cost-effective manner for agencies to 
maintain a SWAT capability.  Agencies that combine their resources are able to field a 
better equipped, trained, and affordable SWAT team. With the development of 
nationally recognized standards, local agreements, and recent successful inter-agency 
operations, traditional objections to multi-agency SWAT teams are no longer viable 
arguments.  Collaboration is the new standard by which agencies can successfully 
serve their community. 
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Across the nation, police administrators are being asked to do more with less.  In 
an era of shrinking budgets and cost cutting measures, many law enforcement agencies 
are searching for ways to maintain an adequate level of service to their respective 
communities while addressing their budgetary limitations. SWAT teams have fallen 
victim to cost conscious administrators and budget planners.  Although indispensible in 
a critical incident, the costs associated with these teams can be, at times, untenable. A 
 
partial solution to this problem can be found in multi-jurisdictional SWAT teams. 
SWAT’s role in today’s law enforcement is as critical as it was when the first SWAT 
team was founded in Los Angeles in 1968.  In fact, the role of SWAT in law enforcement 
has expanded in the decades since their inception. While a discussion of the proper 
utilization of SWAT is beyond the scope of this paper, the multi-jurisdictional approach 
to SWAT teams offers departments several benefits worthy of consideration in their 
attempt to form and sustain a team. 
Although many agencies seek to maintain a SWAT team, the obvious downside 
is the exorbitant costs associated with not only forming a team, but sustaining that team 
every fiscal year it exists.  SWAT teams require expensive equipment, training, and 
personnel costs that could easily eat into a department’s budget, especially in small and 
midsize agencies. Multi-jurisdictional SWAT teams can mollify budget woes by 
distributing the costs associated with SWAT teams among multiple agencies. The 
multi-jurisdictional SWAT concept not only distributes costs associated with forming and 
sustaining teams, it provides for a larger team than any single agency could field alone. 




geographical area.  Additionally, as the role of SWAT teams have enlarged, a multi- 
jurisdictional team can provide a reduction in liability by fielding a better trained and 
better equipped team as well as preventing the proliferation of SWAT teams by 
agencies without sufficient justification for maintaining one. 
There are, however, some significant obstacles that must be overcome before a 
multi-agency SWAT team can be successful. The most obstinate challenge concerns 
command and control of the team.  Many law-enforcement administrators are reluctant 
to capitulate the command and control of their SWAT teams. In any multi-agency 
agreement, there will undoubtedly be some form of power sharing, and administrators 
must be willing to sacrifice some control in order to achieve the larger goal.  However, 
multi-agency agreements have survived, and indeed flourished in many instances, in 
the decades prior to the concept of multi-jurisdictional SWAT teams, to the benefit of the 
combined agencies and the communities they serve. With proper guidance and 
oversight, command and control of a multi-jurisdictional SWAT team can be easily 




Multi-jurisdictional SWAT teams are but another evolution in the rich history of 
 
SWAT. Since the City of Los Angeles (LA) conceived their first SWAT team in 1968, 
 
the role of SWAT has expanded. LA formed their team in response to the riots in Watts, 
but the team soon found itself embroiled in shootouts with bank robbers and the 
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA). The JFK assassination and University of Texas 
shootings prompted other cities to follow suit, and the proliferation of SWAT began in 




training and weapons to combat high-risk situations. However, it did not take long for 
police agencies to realize that military type training and tactics were not always 
applicable to civilian law enforcement. SWAT adapted their training, policies, and 
tactics to suit the conditions of civilian law enforcement. Although not entirely dissimilar 
to military objectives, SWAT teams operate under the constraints of a constitutional 
democracy, and those early teams were forced to adjust their practices to consider due 
process rights of the criminally accused and others. In addition, unlike the military, 
casualties were not acceptable to SWAT teams (TCLEOSE, 2004). 
Today’s fiscal realities are not unlike those early days of SWAT. The times are 
changing, and SWAT must adapt to meet the challenges or run the risk of becoming 
obsolete. Police administrators are searching for ways to trim their operating costs and 
reducing the size or disbanding their SWAT teams altogether offer a tantalizing means 
of assuaging budget woes. Even agencies that have maintained a SWAT team for 
decades have disbanded their SWAT team, like the Shaker Heights, Ohio police 
department’s team of 22 years (O'Brien, 2010).  Rather than face the prospect of not 
having a SWAT team at all, it makes good sense for agencies to combine resources 
and form multi-jurisdictional SWAT teams. According to O’Brien (2010), multi- 
jurisdictional SWAT teams offer an advantage, especially for agencies that do not 
possess adequate personnel or financial resources to support a team exclusive to their 
respective jurisdiction. 
Irrespective of the size of the police agency, SWAT teams are expensive.  The 
very nature of SWAT, specialized weapons and tactics, suggests extreme costs. The 




special weapons utilized are not only diverse in need and application, they are costly to 
acquire and maintain, and all those special weapons and tactics require extensive 
training in order to properly deploy.  In addition to acquiring, maintaining, and training, 
there are personnel costs involved in allocating training time and paying personnel 
during call-outs. To add to the ever-increasing costs of SWAT, many agencies are 
seeking out and utilizing armored vehicles for use in SWAT call-outs. The enormous 
sum of money involved in equipping a SWAT team discourages many departments from 
forming a team; however, the cost of sustaining a team must also be considered.  As 
Tony Cobaugh, President of the Kentucky Tactical Officers Association stated, “A 
community has to make a commitment with standards, a mission, training, and 
equipment. And that is not just initially, that must be sustained to continue the team and 
the mission that it serves” (Foreman, 2010, p. 46). 
Sustaining a team can be more costly than equipping a team. A SWAT team 
needs approximately 21 officers in order to confront a critical incident (Green, 2001). 
This number represents the amount of officers who need to be equipped, maintained, 
trained, and paid. The Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and 
Education (TCLEOSE) cited the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) and the 
Texas Tactical Police Officers Association (TTPOA), which recommended policies that 
part-time teams train a minimum of 16 hours a month and full-time teams train 
approximately 25% of its on-duty time (TCLEOSE, 2004).  It is easy to see how the cost 
associated with sustaining a team could easily become overwhelming, even to 




In order to mitigate the costs associated with SWAT teams, many agencies opt to 
maintain SWAT staffing levels and training hours lower than the recommended 
guidelines. Simply put: SWAT has to make do with less.  Multi-jurisdictional SWAT 
teams offer an attractive alternative to the cost of maintaining a SWAT team. 
Combining resources distributes the cost of maintaining a team among multiple 
agencies. In fact, multi-jurisdictional teams not only reduce the costs to any single 
agency, it provides for an increase of SWAT personnel across a wider geographic area 
by combining the resources of multiple agencies. When multiple agencies contribute 
both personnel and resources to a combined SWAT team, it increases the size of the 
team beyond that which any single team could field and disperses those officers over a 
broader jurisdiction. 
There are several successful instances of multi-jurisdictional teams combining 
their resources in this manner. The combined SWAT team of the south Chicago 
suburbs, comprising of 34 governmental agencies, the South Suburban Emergency 
Response Team, fields 64 officers, seven paramedics, and four crisis negotiators 
(Kwiatkowski, 2010). One of the most successful multi-jurisdictional SWAT teams in the 
nation, the Ogden/Metro SWAT Team in Utah is comprised of 22 officers and six 
technicians from 17 jurisdictions (Twohey, 2000). The combined resources of these 
teams serves to distribute the costs and enhance the benefit to the individual 
communities they serve.  According to Green (2001), “By collaborating on personnel 
and equipment a greater standard of protection can exist” (p. 72). 
 
An enhanced standard of protection is concomitant with a reduction in liability. 




participate not only in a larger team, they join a team that is better equipped and trained 
to handle critical events. The collective resources of the member agencies, greater 
than that any single agency could muster, not only ensures that the SWAT team 
receives adequate training and equipment, but there exists a larger pool of personnel 
from which to select team members.  A larger selection of personnel to choose to 
choose from makes it more likely to staff the team with officers well suited for special 
characteristics demanded from a SWAT officer. 
The reduction of liability is most notable by the nonproliferation of smaller teams, 
which are less likely to be able to afford the training and equipment for the proper 
deployment of a SWAT team. The impulse for smaller agencies to form a SWAT team 
is often very powerful.  In a study performed by Kraska and Cubellis (1997), 473 
agencies with an average of 62 officers responded to a survey that revealed 65% of 
those agencies maintained a SWAT team. An additional 25% responded that they 
planned to form a SWAT team. Given the nationally touted recommended guidelines 
for the training and staffing of SWAT teams by the NTOA, it is difficult to imagine that a 
large portion of smaller agencies possess the resources to adequately train and sustain 
an efficient SWAT team. This is even more troublesome when considering the 
expanding role SWAT teams are being asked to perform, such as drug warrants and 
proactive patrolling. 
According to the study’s authors, “The small number of training hours in these 
[Paramilitary Police Units] PPU’s raises [an] important issue: the degree to which these 
teams approximate the ideal of highly trained, proficient squads of use-of-force 




sustain a SWAT team of their own, smaller agencies would be better served by joining a 
multi-jurisdictional SWAT team. A few, carefully screened and selected, officers from 
small agency teams could join a combined team and pool their resources to develop a 
more highly trained and equipped team than they are capable of fielding alone. The 
more agencies that contribute to the multi-jurisdictional team, the more resources that 
become collectivized and the broader the geographical distribution of properly trained 
SWAT officers would become. Additionally, it is less likely that any small agency would 






The urge to form a SWAT team is almost irresistible and similar to the most 
significant obstacle preventing the use of multi-jurisdictional SWAT teams: local control. 
Texas has a rich history of local control; in fact, it is one of the state’s most defining 
characteristics. The history of strong local control in Texas has led some to conclude 
that “The political culture of Texas is strongly individualistic and conservative…most 
Texans cling to the notion that the ‘best’ government is the one closest to them” (Jones, 
Ericson, Brown, Trotter Jr., & Lynch, 1993). Local control is not exclusively to Texas, 
nor is it limited to the political sphere.  Police administrators across the nation are 
reluctant to form multi-jurisdictional SWAT teams, in part because it entails relinquishing 
some level of control. According to Gabor (1993), the sharing of resources, such as 
SWAT, has made many sheriffs and police chiefs reluctant to join multi-jursidictional 




concerning when and under what circumstances the team would be called upon and 
deployed. 
The reluctance of police administrators to relinquish any level of control of their 
SWAT team was displayed in a recent survey conducted to support the assertion of 
implementing a multi-jurisdictional SWAT team for smaller agencies.  Gregg (2009) 
surveyed police administrators from 12 agencies in North Texas.  Of the eight 
respondents, four indicated their reluctance to form a multi-jurisdictional team due to 
their concern for “who would have the final say when it came down to make a critical 
decision” (Gregg, 2009, p. 10). A fifth respondent had concerns with the methodology 
and standards for selecting personnel for the team. Therefore, Gregg’s findings 
indicated that over half of the police administrators were reluctant to form a multi- 
jurisdictional SWAT team directly due to command and control issues. The result, of this 
admittedly small but nonetheless revealing survey, clearly establishes command and 
control as the single greatest obstacle preventing the proliferation of multi-jurisdictional 
teams. 
The span of command and control concerns generally includes leadership, 
liability, and control of resources. The obstacle can be overcome; however, agencies 
considering a multi-jurisdictional team must address these issues before implementing a 
team. Green (2001) recommended that the combined agencies select a commander for 
the team. The commander will report directly to the scene commander of the respective 
jurisdiction the operation will be conducted. It is important to note, however, that the 
tactical commander will be responsible for the tactical decision making process, 




representative to the overall commander.  Leadership on the team will be distributed 
among the member agencies through the selection of team leaders. Team leaders will 
be responsible for overseeing their agency’s contribution to the combined team and will 
coordinate their respective element in the field under the direction of the team 
commander. Green (2001) pointed to this as a “Positive point…that each agency will 
still have personnel in leadership roles” (p. 72). 
Liability concerns, such as those expressed in the earlier referenced survey, can 
be addressed through Memorandum of Understanding’s (MOUs) with each member 
agency.  Green (2001) pointed to the need for agencies to construct contracts that 
specifically delineate the legal concerns of each member agency. He stated, “Officers’ 
salaries, workers compensation if injured, transportation, equipment, training and 
authority are all issues that must be resolved. These matters can be discussed prior to 
the development of such agreements, and then forwarded to the legal departments of 
each agency” (Green, 2001, p. 69).  An agreement of this nature can be simplified by 
each agency agreeing that such items as salary and workers compensation will be 
maintained by their respective agency according to their departmental policy.  The 
formulation of intergovernmental MOUs is assisted by relatively new standards for 
combined SWAT teams.  Following the events associated with Hurricane Katrina, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency worked with the NTOA to develop 
classifications of SWAT teams, according to a team’s resources and capabilities, in 
order to implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS).  Collaboration 




(RULETC) to develop both standards and training in the formation of multi-jurisdictional 
teams (“Standards for SWAT,” 2009). 
The development of standards for multi-jurisdictional SWAT teams, in 
conjunction with agreed upon terms in MOUs, clearly overcomes the objections of most 
detractors.  Agencies have used a combined approach to other enforcement activities, 
such as drug trafficking task forces, for decades.  Many of these task forces have been 
incredibly productive and can serve as a template for successful interagency 
cooperation in the formation of SWAT teams. Task forces have a clearly defined MOU 
in place for all participating agencies and operate under clearly defined leadership.  An 
approach similar to inter-agency task forces, taken together with industry formulated 
standards, means that agencies seeking to form a multi-jurisdictional SWAT team do 
not need to reinvent the wheel. The facilitation of inter-agency cooperation in SWAT is 




Faced with ever-diminishing resources, police administrators are seeking ways to 
reduce the cost of delivering service.  For many agencies, this includes the elimination 
or reduction in size of their department’s SWAT team. Each of those approaches 
reduces the quality of service available to the community and may expose the 
department to unnecessary liability.  Rather than reducing or eliminating their SWAT 
teams, agencies should consider combining their resources with neighboring 
jurisdictions to form an inter-jurisdictional SWAT team. 
The utilization of inter-jurisdictional SWAT teams can help mollify a department’s 




reduce potential liability.  Combining resources with neighboring jurisdictions, the SWAT 
 
team will be more cost effective, as opposed to maintaining their own independent 
team.  Collectively, member agencies can obtain equipment, personnel, and training 
more without the unnecessary burden of going it alone. A better-trained and equipped 
SWAT team not only provides for highly trained SWAT officers across the broader 
geographic range of participating agencies, it reduces potential liability in fielding an 
under equipped and poorly trained team. 
To avoid issues of command and control of the SWAT team, participating 
agencies can agree to a comprehensive policy and procedure that clearly establishes 
protocol for the team’s command structure and operational guidelines.  Additionally, 
each member agency maintains a voice in the leadership roles within the team.  Unlike 
previous decades, standards for implementing a multi-jurisdictional SWAT team are 
now readily available.  Member agencies can draw on these standards and use 
successful multi-agency task forces as precedent. 
Clearly, the time has arrived for many agencies to consider multi-jurisdictional 
SWAT teams as a cost-effective means of serving their community. The benefit of 
collaboration ensures a better-equipped and trained SWAT team that is both financially 
viable and effective.  Law enforcement administrators should cease asking whether to 
implement a multi-jurisdictional SWAT team; rather, they should be asking how soon 
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